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Abstract
Recently, there has been substantial research in the area of network security. Correlation of
intrusion detection sensor alerts, vulnerability analysis, and threat projection are all being
studied in hopes to relieve the workload that analysts have in monitoring their networks.
Having an automated algorithm that can estimate the impact of cyber attacks on a network
is another facet network analysts could use in defending their networks and gaining better
overall situational awareness.
Impact assessment involves determining the effect of a cyber attack on a network. Im-
pact algorithms may consider items such as machine importance, connectivity, user ac-
counts, known attacker capability, and similar machine configurations. Due to the increas-
ing number of attacks, constantly changing vulnerabilities, and unknown attacker behavior,
automating impact assessment is a non-trivial task. This work develops a virtual terrain that
contains network and machine characteristics relevant to impact assessment. Once popu-
lated, this virtual terrain is used to perform impact assessment algorithms.
The goal of this work is to investigate and propose an impact assessment system to
assist network analysts in prioritizing attacks and analyzing overall network status. VTAC
is tested with several scenarios over a network with a variety of configurations. Insights
into the results of the scenarios, including how the network topologies and network asset
configurations affect the impact analysis are discussed.
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This work develops a system to perform impact assessment of a network and its compo-
nents based on detected cyber attacks. VTAC: Virtual Terrain assisted impact Assessment
for Cyber attacks, is the framework created to perform impact assessment. VTAC contains
a virtual terrain model used to store and relate the necessary ingredients needed to perform
a network impact assessment. Additionally, it incorporates algorithms to process the terrain
and incoming attack actions so as to deduce the impact of cyber attacks.
1.1 Motivation
A modern day network has Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that provide network analysts
with alerts of malicious actions. Analysts typically examine these alerts manually and are
more than often overwhelmed by alert volumes, allowing attacks to slip through [1]. With
4882 vulnerabilities reported in 2005 and 6604 in 2006, approximately a 35% increase
[19], the number of vulnerabilities are simply becoming too large for analysts to keep track
of and understand. Out of the 6604 vulnerabilities from 2006, 85% of them can be attacked
remotely, and 65% lead to disruption of service [19]. An FBI/CSI survey showed that in
2002, 80% of respondents indicated a financial loss as a result of a computer breach, and
25% reported intrusions to law enforcement [6]. These statistics help show the need of a
better line of defense for network intrusions.
The task of assessing cyber attacks has drawn increasing attention from the information
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fusion community. Drawing analogies from traditional fusion problems, assessing cyber
attacks involves detecting, tracking, correlating, analyzing the impact of, and projecting
attack movements. Malicious activity on computer networks trigger IDSs to produce alerts.
Each attack action may trigger zero, one, or many alert messages. Correlating and filtering
alert messages, i.e., observables, provide traces or tracks of ongoing multistage attacks in a
computer network. Precise and timely impact analysis and predictions shall lead to better
decision making and minimal operational interruptions when combating cyber attacks. The
focus of this work is on assessing the impact of the tracked cyber attacks.
Assessing the impact of cyber attack actions depends on the detection and tracking
of malicious activity. Host-based and network based IDSs typically monitor application
and operating system level activity as well as network traffic. Alerts are generated when
monitored activity matches one or more signatures of previously known attacks (signature-
based) or is abnormal and suspicious (anomaly-based). Non-intrusive and intrusive ma-
licious activity detection has been widely tackled yet still continuously poses challenges,
due to the constantly evolving nature of vulnerabilities and, consequently, changes in ex-
ploitation mechanisms. As a result, alert messages produced by IDSs may be incomplete
and misleading.
In 2000, Bass [1] advocated the need of information fusion when facing overwhelm-
ing number of alerts reported on typical enterprise networks. Since then, much work has
been devoted to alert correlation, e.g., INFERD [26], [27], TIAA [20], and MIRADOR
[3]. Correlating IDS alerts involves reasoning based on, primarily, the source and target
IP addresses, the attack type descriptions from the alert messages, and the time interval
between alerts. This set of information helps revealing the courses of action potentially
taken by multistage attacks, which may span over multiple machines or subnets. Alerts
that belong to the same course of action are grouped and traced to form an attack track.
Each attack track, which may be modeled as a directed graph, illustrates the causal and
sequential relationships between alerts belonging to the same multistage attack. Note that
undetected activity and excessive alerts (typically due to reconnaissance activity) may lead
2
to mis-correlated alerts or fragmented attack tracks.
1.2 What is Impact Assessment?
While alert correlation is still under investigation for better accuracy and real-time oper-
ation, the next challenge is to infer future attack actions and assess the impact of attack
actions based on the detected attack tracks. Threat and impact assessment of cyber attacks
may be categorized as a L3 fusion problem based on the Joint Directors of Laboratories
(JDL) fusion model [4], [7] and its revision in 2004 [15]. Impact assessment determines
the consequences that attack actions have on a network and its assets. Threat assessment
involves determining the capability, opportunity, and intent of attack actions, e.g., TANDI
[8]. The JDL fusion model is built from knowledge and information from the ground up
with goals of high-level situational and environmental awareness in mind. Traditionally,
these techniques have been applied to the location, characterization, and identification of
dynamic entities such as emitters, platforms, and weapons that would be of concern to the
military [7]. At the lowest level, the existence of an entity is acknowledged, and by ap-
plying estimation techniques, such as Kalman filter, to the timeseries of inherently noisy
measurements, position and velocity may be calculated. At higher levels, Bayesian Analy-
sis or Dempster-Shafer combination may be used to establish the identity or confidence of
an entity measurement. Rule-based reasoning systems may provide situation assessment
and threat analysis inferring the intent of the enemy.
Figure 1.1 shows a mapping of the JDL fusion levels to cyber security problems. This
mapping divides the problem space into modular sub-tasks. Given the track estimates from
Level 1, this work focuses on estimating the severity of current attack steps on the network
and its assets. Information about network configuration, software vulnerabilities, and the
criticality or importance of each asset is the basis to provide accurate impact assessment.
Striped modules in Figure 1.1 are ones that will be worked on in this thesis.
Typically, impact is thought of as the result or consequence that some action has on a
3
Figure 1.1: JDL fusion levels corresponding to network security
particular entity. Within the cyber domain, this can be interpreted as the potential severity
that a cyber attack may have on the existing network given the current situation. To better
illustrate the concept of impact, an example of a traditional warfare scenario may be used.
Consider a missile launch with potential trajectories indicating impact sites ranging from
a large population center to rural farmlands. The impact assessment could be performed
in terms of several metrics, for example, loss of life to capital or infrastructure damage.
Therefore, one may want to invest their limited defense funding into anti-missile systems
for the areas where an impact would result in the most detrimental assessment. In terms of
actually predicting the assessment, one would like to know, for example, the type of missile
that is launched and the characteristics of its target, which would result in a specific type of
outcome.
Roy, Paradis, and Allouche [24] discuss a typical warfare example of an unknown entity
(red team) coming into range of a specified defending unit (blue team). A number of
metrics are taken into account when determining the threat and eventually impact that this
entity could have. One has to consider the velocity and angle that the entity is coming
towards the defending unit, what type of weapons they may be carrying and at what range
they can reach the defending unit with those weapons. They also mention Closest Point of
Approach (CPA) and Time-to-CPA (TCPA) as important metrics that are based from the
Threat Reference Point (TRP), the position at which the assessment is based [24]. Note that
these metrics may correspond to a cyber attack. As a cyber attack happens, it can occur
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at different speeds and with different attack paths depending on topology and connectivity.
Attack range and capability may depend on the variety of hacking tools and skill that the
attacker has available to them. The CPA and TCPA can also be modeled with respect to the
topology and connectivity. TRP can be determined by what entities (specific host, entire
network, etc.) the network analyst would like to monitor.
Intent analysis is another vital piece of impact assessment [24]. However, unless some-
one is sitting right next to an attacker, it is difficult to find out what their real intent is.
Estimating attacker intent is out of the scope of this thesis.
1.3 Related Work
This section summarizes the related work, including what has been done in the area of
modeling networks with vulnerabilities, impact assessment, and mapping attacks to conse-
quences.
1.3.1 Network Modeling for Analysis Purposes
Vidalis and Jones [30] proposed the use of a vulnerability tree to identify the types of
attacks an attacker could perform to accomplish a goal. Their model requires a separate
vulnerability tree for each possible goal, which could be potentially numerous. These trees
can identify the most significant vulnerabilities of the system depending on the education
level of the hacker.
Philips and Swiler [22] suggested the use of a Bayesian network to model the vul-
nerabilities for risk analysis. Their model assumes acyclic graphs, which implies that bi-
directional connections between hosts must be modeled in separate acyclic graphs.
Massicotte, Couture, Briand, and Labiche [16] discussed ways of introducing contex-
tual information to cross examine with reported IDS alerts and, thus, reduce false posi-
tives. Their experiences suggested that contextual information may be derived by utilizing
Snort [25], Nessus [10] and Bugtraq [5]. They also suggest that a network be modeled
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as objects because network components are inherently modular and each component has
sub-components that follow the same behavior. Our model, developed independently of
Massicotte’s work, shares some similar ideas, yet provides additional network connectiv-
ity, user, privilege, and asset criticality information for impact assessment.
1.3.2 Systems with Impact Analysis
Valeur, Vigna, Kruegel, and Kemmerer [29] introduce a comprehensive alert correlation
system that contains an impact analysis component. They use the impact analysis compo-
nent to, “determine the impact of the detected attacks on the operation of the network being
monitored and on the assets that are targeted by the malicious activity.” Using this informa-
tion, components following the impact analysis can prioritize attack information. Valeur,
et al., use the following information to conduct impact analysis: a service asset database,
service heartbeat monitors, service dependencies, and service importance with respect to
the overall network. The asset database contains information on each service. When a
service is attacked the heartbeat monitor is used to update information about dependent
services.
Porras, Fong, and Valdes [23] discuss M-Correlator, a mission-impact-based approach
to alert prioritization and aggregation. They mention the problem of merging and analyzing
alert information from the growing number of network monitoring devices. Given the
topology and mission of a network, M-Correlator’s goal is to rank and consolidate incoming
alerts based on the degree of threat they pose to the network. They make use of topology
vetting, priority mapping, and incident ranking to assess the impact these alerts can have on
the network mission and the probability of them being successful. The priority component
takes into account the mission of the network by specifying critical incident types and
critical computing and data assets, services, and administrative or untrusted user accounts.
Porras, et al., use a classification system for alerts, which can be ranked with interest levels
specified by an analyst.
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1.3.3 Mapping Attack Categories to Consequences
Howard and Longstaff [9] present a taxonomy that provides a timeline and structure of an
attack. As seen in Figure 1.2, they state that attackers use specific tools in order to exploit a
certain vulnerability. Once the vulnerability is exploited, the attackers use it to perform an
action on a specified target in order to attain an unauthorized result, and finally complete
their objective. The entire process from start to finish is classified as an incident. Executing
a specific action on a target is referred to as the event, and from using the tool until the
attacker gets the unauthorized result is specified as the attack.
The list of actions and unauthorized results in Figure 1.2 can potentially be used to
categorize, at the highest level, the network attack techniques, and the consequences of a
successful attack. The objectives of the overall incident are at a much higher level than
Figure 1.2: Computer and network incident taxonomy [9]
impact assessment will actually assess. Each of the elements in both the attack technique
and consequence groups can be divided into smaller partitions based on particular attacks.
For example, Mirkovic and Reiher [17] present a taxonomy of Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks, shown in Figure 1.3. This taxonomy specifies possible ways a DDoS attack
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Figure 1.3: Taxonomy of DDoS attack mechanisms [17]
can be executed, and the different results that it can have. It shows that a DDoS attack can
be classified by the degree of automation, how it exploits the weakness, source address
validity, attack rate, and persistence of agent set. Figure 1.3 shows that the results of a
DDoS attack can be classified by victim type and impact on the victim. For instance, a
DDoS attack may affect only a host, or possibly the entire network. The way it affects
the host may be degrading, in which it uses up parts of its victim’s resources, or flat out
disruptive, in which recoverability levels differ. Recovery levels should be an important
characteristic to look at when determining the impact. However, the taxonomy does not
provide a link between attack name or execution type and the consequence.
Lindqvist and Jonsson [14], along with the Department of Computer Engineering at
Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden, made a first attempt at correlating attack
type with consequence. In their paper, they use attack technique classifications originally
created from Neuman and Parker, refer to [14] for more information on this. In order to
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correlate attacks to consequences, they utilized 25 undergraduate students who were taking
a course in applied computer security. The test facility consisted of 24 SUN ELC diskless
workstations, all connected to one file-server. Each student accurately recorded their at-
tacks and the administrators set up proper monitoring software to capture all activities and
breaches. Figure 1.4 shows the attack results and is a sub-set of the entire attack technique
taxonomy presented in [14].
Figure 1.4: Sub-set of the taxonomy of intrusion techniques [14]
The resulting taxonomy, shown in the left hand pane of Figure 1.4, is classified by
the three traditional results of computer security: confidentiality, availability, and integrity.
Breeches in these three classifications in turn result in exposure, denial of service, and er-
roneous output, respectively. Each of these have sub-categories that Lindqvist and Jonsson
believe the first two levels are appropriate for all networks. The third level may be more
specific to network system like their own test bed.
Figure 1.5 shows the correlation of attacks to the resulting consequences, and thus
is the basis of a framework for mapping attack techniques to consequences. Notice that
”Bypassing intended controls, password attack by guessing,” (NP5-pg), was executed 12
times during the intrusion experiment, and always resulted in increased access to a user’s
account. However, some attacks did not result in a one-to-one mapping. The extreme case
shows that a ”Bypassing intended controls, by utilizing weak authentication,” (NP5-uwa)
resulted in a mapping to five different sub-classifications in two different taxonomy classes.
It appears that the Chalmers University of Technology has been working on this problem
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of intrusions according to technique and result [14]
since 1997, however it was difficult to find more current results.
Although feasible, the task at hand is extremely large and would take time and resources
only available to a large corporation. This is simply due to the large range of attacks and
vulnerabilities that exist. A variety of organizations have taken on the role of providing up
to date information about attacks and vulnerabilities. A few of these include CVE [18],
Bugtraq [5], US-CERT [28], and Snort [25].
1.4 VTAC Approach
This thesis develops an impact assessment framework, VTAC: Virtual Terrain assisted im-
pact Assessment for Cyber attacks. The design of VTAC is separated into two main com-
ponents: a virtual terrain and impact assessment algorithms. The virtual terrain models
the network, its characteristics, and relationships necessary to perform an impact analy-
sis. Once created, impact assessment can be performed by overlaying attack data onto the
virtual terrain and processing it.
Chapter 2 defines the virtual terrain and discusses how it could potentially be automati-
cally populated. The developed impact algorithms are presented in Chapter 3, followed by
the test network and simulation environment used to test VTAC in Chapter 4. Presentation
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and insight into the results are made in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes what was
accomplished and offers possible extensions to this work.
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Chapter 2
Virtual Terrain Definition and Genera-
tion
This chapter will focus on the virtual terrain that was developed to model networks and
their configuration. The automatic generation of the virtual terrain model and the schema
that can be used to define the terrain are also discussed.
2.1 Preliminary Design Thoughts
The goal in creating a virtual terrain model is to be able to store, gather, and update the
information and characteristics of a computer network necessary to perform impact assess-
ment. These characteristics are discussed in the following sections.
A reasonably secure network typically has multiple access domains. Direct access to
these internal and often critical domains or subnets is limited or prohibited. Serious cyber
attacks, thus, need to exploit different system vulnerabilities and progress through multiple
domains. Reasoning on the progress made by a cyber attack shall benefit from a contextual
model - a virtual cyber terrain that models the logical accessibility from one access domain
to another. Most importantly, the cyber terrain should model the system and network con-
figurations, including their vulnerabilities that may be exposed as the attacker compromises
one or more systems in the network.
Once this model is created and populated, it will be not only be used for storing the
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current state of the network, but also for analysis by impact assessment or other algorithms.
When developing the virtual terrain model, the usage of the terrain should be kept in mind
so that the algorithms may efficiently use it.
2.2 Virtual Terrain Definition
A cyber terrain is modeled as a directed graph consisting of host, router, or user nodes that
are interconnected with directed arcs. Both the nodes and arcs have attributes defined for
impact assessment. The host node represents a machine or cluster of machines, the user
nodes represent users and their accounts, and the router nodes represent connecting devices
such as routers or switches. The attributes for each node may be found in Table 2.1, and
are discussed further in the following subsections.
Within some of the nodes, there exists criticality values. Each of these criticality metrics
are numerical values between 0 and 1 inclusive, defining the importance of the item to its
parent node. A value of 0 means that the item is irrelevant to the operation of the parent,
whereas a value of 1 corresponds to the items being of most value to its parent. A thorough
study of how criticality may be defined to better assess the consequences of cyber attacks
is needed. This work focuses on impact assessment of cyber attack actions and assumes
that the numerical values are given.
Host Router User
A node identifier A node identifier User ID
IP address(es) Router name Account(s) with privilege level
Host name(s) Neighbor Permission List Account criticalities
Machine criticality Allowed (Boolean)











Version(s) with privilege level
Exposures(s) with privilege level
Exposure damage score
Exposure CVE IDs
Table 2.2: Service tree attributes
2.2.1 Hosts
Notice that a single Host node may have multiple IP addresses to define a cluster of iden-
tically configured hosts or servers. This simplifies the terrain model as well as the impact
assessment process. Machine criticality represents how important the operation of a host
is to the overall network or a subnet of computers. Items that may affect this score may
include, but are not limited to: what type of machine it is (workstation, File Server, Web
Server, etc.), and how much volume of traffic it receives. The neighbor list on a host de-
fines what other hosts and routers are directly connected it. Two attributes are defined with
every arc: Allowed and Permission List. The Permission List contains a lists of protocols
and IP addresses. The Allowed attribute is a Boolean value. When the attribute is ‘true’
the protocols and IP addresses on the Permission List are the only protocols and addresses
allowed, and everything else is blocked. A value of ‘false’ defines the opposite.
Service Tree
Each Host node may have one or more services running; here we define service in a gen-
eral term that includes both remote services and local user applications. A service tree is
used to represent each service available in the node. Each service has a criticality value
that corresponds to the importance of the service to its parent host. At the terrain model
development phase, all running services will be scanned by tools to determine the open
ports and vulnerabilities of each machine. This information then can be used to build the
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service trees in each machine. To build these trees, one or more databases must be cross-
referenced to determine which exposures and exploits should be mapped to each version
of the running services. As also suggested by Massicotte et al.[16], we adopt Snort [25],
Bugtraq [5], Nessus [10], and NMAP [11] to build a service database that will aid the cre-
ation of a service tree. The service tree will capture the name of the service, versions of
that service that are running, and the IDS alerts that could be reported if the corresponding
vulnerabilities were exploited.
A key feature of the service tree model presented here is that it captures privilege differ-
ences between services and between versions of the same service. Like regular users, every
service runs at a given privilege level. While many services do run at the system level,
other services can run only at the user level. If a service is exploited, the attacker usually
gains access to the computer at the level of the service. In addition, services may be local
or remote. A remote service can be compromised without obtaining access privilege to the
computer hosting the service. Such services typically listen on a specified TCP/UDP port.
A local service is a service that can only be exploited after the attacker gains access to the
computer hosting the service.
The version(s) of each service are found on the second level of the tree. It is possible
that multiple versions of the same service could be running on the same host. For example,
a web programmer may wish to run multiple versions of Mozilla Firefox concurrently to
test for the compatibility of a web site between different versions. Some vulnerabilities
could be fixed or introduced from version to versions. Also, a specific version may also
have a privilege different from that of its parent service. Therefore, our model allows the
privilege to be defined explicitly for each version of each service. By default, if no privilege
is defined, a version will inherit the privilege of its parent service.
The actual IDS alerts are the children of the versions. The IDS alerts classified under
a service and version imply that if an IDS alert was reported on that host, the parent ver-
sion of the service is affected by that alert. Like versions, these IDS alerts can also inherit
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the privilege level of its parent. Some IDS alerts may not correspond to actual vulnera-
bility exploits. For example, knowledge discovery attacks such as a TCP Syn attack may
indicate that the target host is alive, but will not compromise any privileges to the hosts.
Such alerts are defined with a ‘None’ privilege. The exposure damage score is used to
determine the severity that an exposure may cause to a service given an alert. This damage
score can be manually assigned by the security analysts or derived from different vulnera-
bility scoring systems, such as Microsoft’s proprietary scoring system [2], US-CERT [28],
SANS [12], and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [21]. CVSS is an open
framework that provides equations for people (software vendors, security analysts, etc.) to
prioritize risks associated with vulnerabilities across a common scoring scale. Besides the
base vulnerability score, CVSS allows adjustments for temporal and environmental con-
ditions. The temporal metric allows for adjusting vulnerability characteristics that change
over time. The environmental metric represents changes to the vulnerability characteristics
with respect to the network environment. Final CVSS scores range between 0 and 10 in-
clusive, with 0 meaning the vulnerability is harmless and 10 corresponding to a more lethal
type.
The service trees provide a structural model to determine the extent to which services
are compromised on each host. More specifically, it helps to determine the privilege(s)
obtained by the attacker during the process of an attack. It also filters out false positive,
i.e., alerts that do not correspond to a service running on the target host or subnet. Further-
more, and perhaps more importantly, by correlating the services and privileges in different
machines, the cyber terrain may be used to deduce potentially threatened targets with sim-
ilar or the same running services. Inference using the services, however, depends on the
connectivity between hosts and subnets.
2.2.2 Routers
In analyzing the progression of cyber attacks, the physical topology of the network is not
entirely relevant. Routers and switches allow communications between hosts despite them
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not being physically connected. The communications that take place between hosts, how-
ever, are subject to the configuration of the hosts themselves as well as the configuration of
the routers and switches between the hosts. The attributes of the directed arcs in the cyber
terrain are defined to capture these restrictions. Similar to the Host node, two attributes
are defined with every arc: Allowed and Neighbor Permission List. Rather than containing
access information to a single IP, the routers Neighbor Permission List defines traffic flow
between a router’s neighbors.
2.2.3 Users
Users typically have different types of accounts on different domains of machines. Ac-
counts are used to identify the privilege level and purpose of hosts that the user can access.
Each account has a criticality that defines how important the account is to its parent user.
For example, workstations and servers may be put into separate accounts because they
perform different tasks for a user.
2.2.4 VT Graphical Representation
Figure 2.1 shows a graphical representation of the virtual terrain described. The Host/Host
Clusters are represented in the middle column as nodes with service instantiations as their
children. The square children nodes of the services are the specific IDS alert exposures
related to each service. The right side of the figure is each user and its associated accounts.
The rectangular figures on the left side represent the routers. The hosts and routers form
a bipartite graph in the rights side of the figure, with each user account mapping mapping
to its respective hosts, and vice versa. The routers and hosts form a tree structure to show
the path that traffic will physically flow between nodes. The solid lines represent the traffic
flow between to nodes, while the dotted lines represent a physical connection, however it
is not the path for traffic. Each of the firewall rule entries show the restrictions for traffic
flow between each node.
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Figure 2.1: A graphical representation of the virtual terrain
2.2.5 Basic Virtual Terrain Implementation Details
The implementation of the virtual cyber terrain was done using Java 1.6.0 v1.0. An object-
oriented approach was taken, keeping the structure similar to a network and its components.
To help implementation go smoothly, a few assumptions were made without compromising
the integrity of the model:
• All components are physically connected via a LAN. No wireless connections are
used.
• A host only has one LAN connection, which must be connected to a router.
• A router may have multiple hosts and/or routers as neighbors.
• Only node assertions can be guaranteed to update correctly in real-time. To update
other parts of the network, the terrain should be re-initialized.
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The top level host, router, and user nodes are included in the .virtualterrain package,
whereas the service tree levels were implemented in the .exposures package. The actual
VirtualTerrain object was created simply to be a data structure with standard methods for
getting and setting attribute values. An additional VTProcessor class, discussed in Section
3.3 can be used for gathering specific types of data or performing more in-depth actions
on the VirtualTerrain object. Figures 2.2-2.4 can be referenced for the created objects and
their methods used to implement the VirtualTerrain.
For more specific details about the virtual terrain implementation, please refer to the
source code found on the thesis CD.
2.3 Generating the Virtual Terrain
The creation of a cyber terrain involves determining services running on each machine
and cross-referencing those services with relevant vulnerabilities. Given the large variation
in services that could run on a host and the large number of IDS alerts corresponding to
vulnerabilities of the services, it is not realistic to manually create and update an accurate,
complete cyber terrain for even a small network.
To automate the creation of a cyber terrain, a database mapping IDS alerts to susceptible
services and versions is necessary. From the IDS alert alone, it is impossible to accurately
determine what service was compromised by that attack. However, databases, e.g., Nes-
sus and Bugtraq, provide information on which services (and versions) are susceptible to
which vulnerabilities. In 2005, Massicotte, et al.[16], noted that 47% of Snort alerts did
not provide Nessus or Bugtraq references, so those alerts need to be manually classified.
Besides updating references, this would only be a one-time inconvenience.
Scanners such as Nessus and NMAP can be used to scan the network for the remote
services running on each machine. Once the services are identified, the database discussed
above can be queried for relevant IDS alerts and the service trees then can be created for
each host. Nessus does provide CVSS scores, CVE IDs, and Bugtraq IDs for a select set
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Figure 2.2: .virtualterrain package UML class diagram
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Figure 2.3: .exposures package UML class diagram
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Figure 2.4: VirtualTerrain object UML class diagram
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of vulnerabilities. The network scanning provides only remotely exploitable services. For
some of these services, Nessus can provide user information along with Administrator,
Guest, or User privilege level. Local services would need to be identified by the adminis-
trator or a local scan of each hosts.
The directed arcs representing allowed and banned protocol communication between
hosts are critical to the terrain model. One possible way to define the arcs is by having each
host scan all other hosts to determine remote access protocols or ports that are allowed
or banned. NMap does have limited capability to penetrate poorly configured network
obstructions such as firewalls. It could potentially be used to scan other hosts. This could,
however, generate unwanted traffic. Alternatively, we could analyze or scan router and
firewall configurations to determine the set of protocols allowed or banned between access
domains or subnets. If the network contained dynamic firewall rules, update scans would
have to be often run, or a system that monitors rule changes could be used.
From our research, it is unknown if criticality data can be gathered automatically. Defin-
ing the machine, service, and account criticalities is something that can be done initially by
a network administrator.
Ideally, multiple scanners could be used to gather the necessary information and would
all have the same output reports. A particularly interesting software package is NetMap,
developed by the Reliable Software Group from the Department of Computer Science at
the University of California Santa Barbara [31]. NetMap’s purpose is to combine such
common network scanning tools, making use of each tool’s specialty, and use them to gain
as much network information as possible. The results are then presented in a common
format. If all of the necessary scanners did exist, a tool like NetMap could be used to
automatically create the virtual terrain.
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2.4 Virtual Terrain Schema
The focus of this work is to create a virtual terrain that can be used for impact analysis.
Since a complete set of tools to gather all of the network information are not readily avail-
able, we create a virtual terrain schema that is used to define the virtual terrain. The schema
is structured similarly to that of the virtual terrain, but has been slightly modified to ease
the process of defining the virtual terrain model.
The schema is defined using the Extensible Markup Language (XML). XML provides
an easy way to define nodes and their underlying attributes. An XML document is primarily
made up of Elements and Attributes. Elements can be thought of as main objects and
Attributes typically represent information about those objects. Figure 2.5 depicts a high
level view of the virtual terrain schema, showing all of the Elements used to define the
terrain.
Figure 2.5: High level view of the virtual terrain schema
Notice that the Figure 2.5 shows Host/HostCluster, Router, and User elements that
match to the nodes discussed in Section 2.2. Link and Subnet elements are additional to
aid in defining physical network connections and the Router Neighbor Permission List.
These two XML elements do not translate to specific objects in the virtual terrain, rather
they add attributes to the Host and Router objects. The next subsection provides details










<Host id="" ip="" name="" operation_criticality="" allowed="">
<PermissionList ip="" >
<Port port="" protocol="" />
</PermissionList>
<Service name="" privilege="" operation_criticality="">
<Version name="" privilege="">
<Port port="" protocol="" />
<Exposure alert_signature="" privilege="" cvss_base_score="">





<Router id="" ip="" name="" allowed="" >
<NeighborPermissionList sourceID="" destID="" >
<Port port="" protocol="" />
</NeighborPermissionList>
</Router>
<HostCluster id="" name="" operation_criticality="" allowed="">
<ClusterMember ip="" />
<PermissionList ip="" >
<Port port="" protocol="" />
</PermissionList>
<Service name="" privilege="" operation_criticality="">
<Version name="" privilege="">
<Port port="" protocol="" />
<Exposure alert_signature="" privilege="" cvss_base_score="">





<Link sourceID="" destID="" />




2.4.1 XML Virtual Terrain Schema Reader
Java and JDOM (a Java API to manipulate XML) [13] were used to implement an object
that can read in the schema and translate it to a VirtualTerrain object. The developed
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functions parse and analyze the XML elements and attributes and use that information
to create the virtual terrain. Figure 2.6 shows the UML diagram of the .io package that
implements the XMLVirtualTerrainReader Object. The VTXMLElements object contains
all of the constants used to define the schemas elements and attributes.
Most of the translation from the schema to the virtual terrain is self explanatory. Each
Host/HostCluster and Router object have numerical unique identifiers that make populating
the schema easier than providing specific names or IP addresses. Tables 2.3-2.6 provide
details on the elements that may be unclear on how they are used.
One major item that has still not been covered is how the Internet will be defined. This
is essential because the majority of attacks are outsider attacks, not insider. To model the
Internet, a Host element can be used with the following configuration:
<Host id="0" ip="XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX" name="INTERNET"
operation_criticality="0.0" allowed="0" />
Once created, the components unique identifier can be used, via Link and Router Permis-
sion List elements to connect gateway routers directly to the Internet.
For more details on how this reader works, please see the source code located on the
thesis CD.
Link
Purpose: To define a physical, two-way connection between network components.
1. The srcID may only be a Host/HostCluster or Router ID.
2. The dstID may be a Host/HostCluster, Router, or Subnet ID.
Table 2.3: Link element rules
Subnet
Purpose: To group a set of Host(s)/HostCluster(s) together that have the same
neighbors and same permissions from their neighbors.
1. A subnet cannot contain another subnet.
2. A subnet cannot contain routers.
Table 2.4: Subnet element rules
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Router Neighbor Permission List
Purpose: To define the traffic allowed or banned between a router’s neighbors.
1. When allowed==1, if a component is not in the Permission List, the connection
is considered closed. If a component is in the list, but empty, the connection is
completely open. Else, the connection is limited to the ports and protocols in the list.
2. srcID and dstID can be a Host/HostCluster, Router, or Subnet ID.
Table 2.5: Router Neighbor Permission List element rules
Host Permission List
Purpose: To define the traffic allowed or banned to a host from a specific IP address.
1. When allowed==0, if a component is not in the Permission List, the connection
is considered completely open. If a component is in the list, but empty, the
connection is closed. Else, the connection is limited to the ports and protocols not on the list.
2. Component must be defined by IP address.
Table 2.6: Host Permission List element rules
27
Figure 2.6: .io package UML class diagram
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Chapter 3
VTAC’s Attack Processing and Impact
Assessment Algorithms
This chapter will present both the attack processing and impact assessment algorithms used
in VTAC. It will include a brief discussion about how the algorithms make use of the virtual
terrain.
3.1 Attack Processing
The input to VTAC is IDS alerts. These alerts typically provide information such as source
IP, destination IP, port, protocol, and an alert signature. Sometimes some of the information
may be left out. For example, the port or protocol may be missing if the IDS cannot
determine it. VTAC requires that the input be in the following format:
src<srcIP> dst<dstIP> port<port#> protoc<protocol> alertSig<alertSignature>
The alerts received by VTAC are assumed to have already gone through an alert corre-
lator and false positive filter. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are many existing systems
and research projects whose primary focus is to correlate and filter alerts. Aside, it is
well-known that false positives may still slip through these filters. Using the virtual terrain
model and the attack data, VTAC can provide an additional layer of false positive filtering.
Once processed, each attack will be labeled as either a logical or an illogical attack. To be
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categorized as logical, all of the attack processing steps must be passed. Pseudo-code for
the attack processing steps are displayed in Figure 3.1.
Boolean logicalAttack = false;
List validAttackPorts = {};
PortInfo givenPort = port/protocol from alert;
List<PortInfo> exposurePorts = {};
if( dst exists && dst.hasExposure(alertSig) ){
//Get ports that attack could logically happen on.
if( !givenPort.isEmpty() ){




//Ensure valid attack ports do not violate dst machine’s personal banned list. Modify.
validAttackPorts = validAttackPorts ∩ (ports /∈ dst.getBannedList(src));
//Find the path for attack, and get allowed firewall rules along path.
path = spanningTree(src, dst);
pathRules = getFirewallRules( path );
//Compare current set of ports against the paths firewall rules





Figure 3.1: Pseudo-code for determining if an attack is logical
If the attack is logical, then it would seem as though the false-positive filters worked
correctly. However, if the attack is illogical, there could be one of two problems: either
the IDS alert is in fact a false positive, or there is an error in the way the virtual terrain is
configured.
30
3.2 Impact Assessment Algorithms
To assess the impact of the attacks, a heuristic scoring scheme is developed to quantify
the relative severity of damage on each network component. We define the impact scores
for the hosts IH , the services IS , the users IU , and the subnets or the entire network IN as
follows. Let H , S, U , and N be the set of hosts, services, users, and subnets (including the
entire network), respectively. The lowercase letters shall represent the elements belonging
to their corresponding sets. Let X act as a wild card for H, S, U, or N . Note that multiple
host nodes may run independent instances of same services. These instances are denoted
as e ∈ E. In other words, if categorized in the type of service, E shall reduce to S. The
combination rules that are used within the algorithms may not be the best, however they do
allow us to demonstrate the concept of impact assessment.
3.2.1 Host Impact
Definition: The potential damage done to a host with respect to its services and their
importance to the host.
To capture the current impact of a host, we analyze the services and the exposures that
exist on that host. The impact score of a host (IH), represented in Figure 3.2, is determined
by looking at the importance of each service with respect to its parent host, and the damage
score of the asserted exposures for each service. For each service on the host, the maximum
asserted exposure damage score is retrieved and normalized to fit a 1.0 scale. The resulting
score, αe, represents the maximum damage that is imposed to the parent service:
αe = max
k∈K∗(e,t)
(αk); [0, 1] (3.1)
Where αk is the damage score assigned to the vulnerability exposure k and K∗(e, t) is the
set of asserted exposures associated with the service instance e at time t. The impact score
for a host (Equation 3.2) combines each αe score with its respective service criticality (ce)
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e∈E(h) ce · αe∑
e∈E(h) ce
; [0, 1] (3.2)
This score will be important to analysts because it shows what hosts have been attacked,
and the severity of the attack. The higher the IH , the more damaged the host is considered.
3.2.2 Service Impact
Definition: How potentially compromised a particular service is over a given network.
To calculate the impact score for a service (IS), every instance of a given service running
in different hosts on the network is analyzed. This algorithm is represented in Figure 3.3.
For each instance, the same combination rule is used as in the IH calculation to get the
maximum asserted exposure damage score, αe (Equation 3.1). However, since in our terrain
model we did not define an operation criticality score for services with respect to the overall
network, we use a different combination rule to determine the IS . Equation 3.3, a normal
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Figure 3.3: Impact score algorithm for a service
average of αe scores, is used to define the IS:
IS(s) = avge∈E(s)(αe); [0, 1] (3.3)
The impact score of a given service will give the network analyst an idea of how severely
compromised a particular service is across the entire network. For example, assume there
are two identical FTP servers in the network running a standard FTP service. If one of them
is attacked, asserting an exposure with a damage score of 1.0, then the impact score of the
FTP service would be considered 0.5.
3.2.3 User Impact
Definition: How potentially damaged the hosts are that a particular user has accounts on,
with respect to the importance of those accounts.
User impact can be thought about as what affect attacks have on a user. The purpose
of this score is to give the analyst a way to see what users have been affected by an attack.
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It implies how badly compromised, or infected the machines that they use and access cur-
rently are. The impact score for a user (IU ), Figure 3.4, is determined by first looking at
Figure 3.4: Impact score algorithm for a user
how severely compromised each host is within each account. To get a feel for this, we can
use the normal average combination rule on the IH for each account, Equation 3.4:
βa = avgh∈H(a)(IH(h)); [0, 1] (3.4)
Secondly, each of these accounts have different criticality scores with relation to its parent
user. The weighted average of the βa scores and the account criticality (λa) (Equation 3.5)





; [0, 1] (3.5)
3.2.4 Network Impact
Definition: How potentially damaged the entire network is with respect to the alerts re-
ceived per its machines.
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The network impact score will allow an analyst to monitor the healthiness of their
network. The overall calculation of this score, shown in Figure 3.5, is primarily driven
by each of the machines’ operation criticality (ηh) with respect to the overall network, or
for that matter, whatever group of machines that the analyst would like to monitor. Due to
Figure 3.5: Impact score algorithm for the overall network
this, if the criticality values are properly assigned and machines are “zeroed out”, this score
could represent the impact on the overall network or a department within the network. The
resulting impact score for the network (IN ), is calculated using the weighted average of






; [0, 1] (3.6)
3.2.5 Reference Impact Scores
The four impact scores defined thus far, allow a network analyst to see the current damage
done to the network. This may be sufficient to perform a rudimentary analysis, however
it seems as though these scores are lacking a reference point to the potential damage that
can actually be done. Since the current impact scores largely rely on exposure damage
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scores and different criticalities, depending on the network configuration, impact scores
may be incapable of reaching the maximum score of 1.0. To put the impact scores into
reference with the current and potential situation, we propose two functions for each of
the components being analyzed. These new reference scores will give an analyst a better
overall view of the current situation. The two reference scores are defined as follows:
• Impact score for X with Maximum Exposure for all Hosts (IX-MEH) - Repre-
sents the highest possible impact score that a component could have, given that for
all of the services related to it, regardless whether it is asserted or not, their exposure
with the highest damage score is asserted.
• Impact score for X with Maximum Exposure for asserted Services (IX-MES)
- Represents the highest possible impact score that a component could have, if for
all of the asserted services related to it, their respective exposure with the highest
damage score is asserted.
The IX-MEH score can put the impact scores into perspective by showing the analyst
the maximum damage that can be done to the X component. The calculation of IX-MEH
for host, service, user, and network is similar as described in the previous sections, ex-
cept for Equation 3.1. Instead, Equation 3.7 is used to calculate α, analyzing all existing
exposures, not only the asserted ones.
αe = max
k∈K∗(e)
(αk); [0, 1] (3.7)
Where this time, the iteration is done over K∗(e), all exposures associated with the service
instance e.
The score resulting from the second algorithm, IX-MES , shows the analyst the max-
imum potential impact score given the currently asserted services. This results from an
attacker fully exploiting the services of which they have already attacked, only on the hosts
that they have already attacked. Figures 3.6 - 3.9 provide more details on how the IX-
MES scores are calculated for hosts, services, users, and networks. Notations E(h)∗(t)
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Figure 3.6: MES impact score algorithm for a host
Figure 3.7: MES impact score algorithm for a service
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Figure 3.8: MES impact score algorithm for a user
Figure 3.9: MES impact score algorithm for the network
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and E(s)∗(t) are used to represent the set of services on host h and the set of service in-
stances of service s that are currently asserted at time t.
3.2.6 Projection
The algorithms presented in the previous sections assess the current impact that the attack
may have. They do not provide projection capabilities of what the next attack actions could
or will likely be. Knowing what an attacker is going to do next or what their real intent
is, would be useful for an analyst. With this information they could take more appropri-
ate actions to stop the attack, and limit both the harm to the network and the temporary
inconvenience placed upon users for shutting down or closing connections on parts of the
network. Another way to use this information could be to run simulated attacks to help
identify the weaknesses of a network and common attack patterns.
The virtual terrain defined in Chapter 2 has the potential to be used for impact projec-
tion. A possible algorithm may include looking for machines that have the same exposures
as those that have been already attacked. These machines can be checked against router
configurations and the machines own firewall list to determine if an attack is even plausible
given the current network setup. Another algorithm may find machines reachable from one
hop, analyze their services, users, and overall importance to the network. These are just a
few undeveloped ideas for projection algorithms using the virtual terrain model. They will
not be discussed further in this thesis.
3.2.7 Computational Complexity with Virtual Terrain
The virtual terrain discussed in Chapter 2 was designed for algorithms to easily be able
to use it. Ideally, once an attack is processed and the exposure is asserted, the affected
components should be able to be retrieved quickly and only their impact scores should be
updated. This is in fact how the algorithms operate, with the components being looked up
with a key to a HashMap, which is performed in constant time, O(c). Once the algorithm
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has the desired object, it can now traverse up or down its parent/child tree (Section 2.2) to
gather the necessary objects to perform the impact algorithms on. Given the destination IP
and alert signature, Table 3.1 shows the pseudo-method-calls needed to get the components
from the virtual terrain (vt) to be analyzed for impact assessment on a per attack basis.







Table 3.1: Pseudo-method-calls for retrieving objects to perform impact analysis on per
attack
3.3 Basic Implementation Details
To keep a modular design, the implementation of both the attack processing and impact
assessment algorithms is done separately from the virtual terrain. This allows future at-
tack processing or assessment algorithms to be easily added, without disrupting existing
functions.
The VirtualTerrain class from Section 2.2 was primarily designed as a data structure,
not a data processor. Therefore, the VTProcessor class was created to hold the variety of
functions used to do in depth processing of the virtual terrain. The idea is that any algorithm
that would be using the virtual terrain could make use of this class. The implemented
function signatures can be seen in Figure 3.10.
To process attacks and implement the specific impact assessment algorithms, the At-
tackProcessing class, Figure 3.11 was created. This class stores and controls all of the
impact score data and controls attack processing as discussed in Section 3.1. To aid in
executing and organizing these algorithms, the AttackProcessing class makes use of the
VTProcessor class for detailed data retrieval or processing of the virtual terrain model.
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Figure 3.10: VTProcessor UML class diagram
41
Figure 3.11: AttackProcessing UML class diagram
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Chapter 4
Simulator and Test Network Configu-
ration
This chapter will discuss how the attack experiments were conducted, how data was col-
lected, and the test network that the experiments were run on. In Section 4.1, the software
developed to simulate the attacks and impact assessment algorithms will be presented, fol-
lowed by Section 4.2 which introduces the test network and its configuration, developed to
run the attack data and impact algorithms.
4.1 Attack and Virtual Terrain Simulator
In Chapters 2 and 3, the framework and algorithms to perform impact assessment were
introduced. A tool capable of running attacks is needed, showing the current status of the
virtual terrain, and displaying or collecting the different impact scores for hosts, services,
users, and the network.
Developed using Java 1.6.0 v1.0, the GUI shown in Figure 4.1 is used to drive the attack
experiments. This GUI was developed strictly for testing and experimental purposes, so it
may not have all of the features or display the data in the way a commercial product would.
It has three windows, each with its own purpose:
• Information Window - Displays the current status of the virtual terrain. Individual
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Figure 4.1: Screenshot of the impact assessment tool GUI in the middle of an attack.
hosts, routers, services, and users can be selected to display all of the relevant in-
formation for that object. This informs the user as to what exposures, services, and
hosts have been asserted by an attack.
• Impact Scores Window - Displays the current impact scores for hosts, services,
users, and the network in a table. The table can be sorted ascending or descending
with respect to any column.
• Attack Steps Window - This window drives the simulator. It is primarily used to
load and process attacks, but also controls whether or not to have VTAC fully process
illogical attacks, as discussed in Section 3.1. There can be three different labels on an
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attack once it enters VTAC: ++ (logical attack, attack processed), -+ (illogical attack,
attack processed), or - - (illogical attack, attack not processed). Processing an attack
means to assert the respective exposure.
Since the Impact Scores Window only displays the current impact score, and does not
keep track of past scores, data collection can become difficult, especially for attacks with
many steps. To help ease the data collection process, an impact score writer has also been
implemented that records the impact scores for each component every time an attack step
is executed. Each group of scores is output to a semi-colon delimited file that can easily be
imported and processed in Microsoft Excel.
The source code for the attack simulator GUI can be found on the thesis CD.
4.2 Test Network
To examine and validate the performance of the virtual terrain and impact assessment al-
gorithms, a test network needs to be created. Ideally, this network would be similar to an
enterprise network, and cyber attack data would be publicly available for testing. From
the research done on this project, we have not found that these items are readily available
to the public. Valeur, Vigna, Kruegel, and Kemmerer [29] discuss that there is a lack of
networks with full configurations needed to provide impact assessment. For VTAC, crit-
icality metrics are a key item for the impact scores. These criticalities essentially map to
the relationships between network assets such as machines, services, users, and vulnerabil-
ities. By not having these relationship definitions, there is a large hole in the data needed to
conduct impact assessment. Also, network infrastructures support different missions which
are nearly impossible to interpret, especially without the asset relationships. Valeur, et al.,
also mention the lack of real world attack data sets and what their purposes are. Initially
the focus of these data sets was on testing low-level attack detection systems and now it
has shifted to high-level attack analysis. Even so, these new data sets are more focused
on testing alert correlation systems, not impact assessment systems. Regardless, without a
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fully defined network (including mission statements) to go along with the correlated alerts
these data sets would not provide us much value.
After thorough discussions with network security specialists and IT personnel, a mock
network was created and configured to the best of our knowledge to help demonstrate im-
pact assessment. Attack scenarios are created from IDS alerts to simulate different types of
attack. These scenarios are assumed to be output from an alert correlator such as INFERD
[26], [27]. They will be presented in Chapter 5 along with the results.
A few comments should be made about the design and configuration of this network and
networks in general. First, even if a network is secured as tightly as possible and has all of
the correct configurations, if the applications running on the network have vulnerabilities,
the network can still be intruded. Secondly, it is not uncommon for networks to have
security holes resulting from lackadaisical configurations. Lastly, and most importantly,
the purpose of this network is to test the concept of impact assessment and to validate the
algorithms. For this reason alone, we want a variety of network configurations to be able
to test, most of which should have security holes that can be exploited.
4.2.1 Network Configuration
Figure 4.2 shows the terrain information associated with the test network. It was designed
using a layered network approach, with each successive layer capable of having choke
points to restrict traffic flow. Typically on a layered network, traffic is limited flowing down
the network, but is free to travel up the network. By creating server or demilitarized zone
(DMZ) subnets “out-of-band,” this prevents traffic that is flowing up and out of the network
from accessing the servers. Figure 4.3 summarizes the router configurations (traffic flow)
on a neighbor-to-neighbor basis. The table gives the services that have access from the top
row to the left column IP address.
For further details on the network configuration not found in the following subsections,
please refer to the XML file on the thesis CD that defines the configuration of this network.
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Servers
The 192.168.1.X subnet provides public services to external users, which include an ex-
ternal web server, a mail server, and an FTP server. Subnet 192.168.3.X includes all of
the internal services, including an internal web server, an SQL server, a domain controller,
and a file server. The internal web server is one that can be accessed network wide and
functions as this network’s intranet. The centralized domain controller is the point of au-
thentication for most of the network, and the main file server serves as a data repository for
some of the departments. Each server has at least some of the necessary remote services
running on the machine required to provide that service.
Departments
The network was initially setup with four departments. To aid in examining impact data
and creating interesting situations, each of them has a different configuration and plays a
unique role. Each department, which all contain a cluster of workstations, may or may
not have access to the centralized domain controller and file server. Depending on their
configuration, they may have their own group of servers on a separate subnet, or even on
the same subnet. Table 4.1 summarizes the key aspects of each department. Department
Authentication File System Other Access
Department Main Internal Main Internal Mail FTP Int. Web Internet
A X - - X X X X X
B X - X X X X X X
C - X - X X - X X
D X - X - X X X X
Table 4.1: Summary of department configurations
C is locked down relatively tightly, because it has its own internal file server and domain
controller, so there is no need for file or authentication traffic to be allowed through to its
department. Comparatively, Department B is relatively exposed. Although it has its own
file server, it also has access to the main domain controller and file server, thus permitting
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file and authentication traffic. For more detailed information about what type of traffic is
permitted, please see Figure 4.3.
Users
Figure 4.2 indicates the users and the machines they have accounts on. The services running
on each machine are also displayed. The users are assigned accounts to specific department
workstations and also have accounts on machines that they subscribe to, e.g., a file or FTP
server. A global Administrator exists that has accounts on every machine in the network.
Departmental administrators also exist. Most regular users only have access to one de-
partment. However both Jon and Kate have access to two departments. Jon has access to
Departments A and B and Kate has access to Departments B and C.
4.2.2 Populating the Network
The test network created does not physically exist, therefore Nessus, NMap, or other scan-
ners could not be used. The network characteristics were manually entered into the virtual
terrain schema.
The machine, service, and account criticality values along with the exposure damage
values were arbitrarily assigned. Values were entered that seemed reasonable for the mis-
sion of the network infrastructure. For example, for the machine criticalities, servers are
generally given higher values because they play a more important role in the overall net-
work. Depending on what type of server, and the location (main or department specific
server), the criticality could also be affected. Service criticality values are determined by
how important that service is to that respective machine. The FTP service that an FTP
server provides is obviously more important to its functional purpose than a telnet or re-
mote media service. Exposure damage scores were populated with respect to the type of
attack they are associated with. Table 4.2 shows an outline of the damage scores assigned to
each exposure. Notice that the impact algorithms from Chapter 3 do not take into account
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Table 4.2: Summary of populating exposure damage scores
privilege level. The separation of categories compensates for this. Account criticality val-
ues were based on how important the machines on that account are for the user. For normal
users, Table 4.3 is used to outline how important machines typically are. Administrator’s






Table 4.3: Summary of populating normal user account criticalities
account scores are similar to that of a normal user, except that they are given a high criti-
cality for the machines that they are directly responsible for.
Both Tables 4.2 and 4.3 act as guidelines to assign the respective scores. All scores may
not follow the tables exactly. For more details on what criticality scores were assigned, refer
to the XML schema definition on the thesis CD.
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Figure 4.2: Test network showing machine services and user accounts
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The main goal of this research is to introduce the capabilities of the virtual terrain and to
present results from the developed impact assessment algorithms. The emphasis of this
chapter is not on the actual performance of the algorithms, rather to show that impact score
trends correctly align with the attacks presented and how network analysts may interpret or
use the results. Eight different attack scenarios will be reviewed, discussing key aspects of
each one and potentially how a network analyst could use this information to advance their
knowledge of the attacks.
5.1 Impact Scores Illustrated via Scenario 1
Figure 5.1 illustrates a fairly simple cyber attack and can be used to demonstrate the basic
capabilities of the impact assessment algorithms. Each of the red arrows and attack bubbles
identifies the steps in an attack, showing where the attack is coming from and the victim
machine. Table 5.1 gives a summary of the steps and the corresponding flagged IDS alert.
The next few sub-sections show impact score results at every attack step, and briefly discuss
how they follow the intended patterns.
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Figure 5.1: Topological view of scenario 1’s attack steps
Step Description Source IP Dest IP Port/Prot Alert Signature
1 Compromise FTP Server 129.21.168.101 192.168.1.4 21/tcp WEB-MISC /home/ftp access
2 Step to Internal Web Server 192.168.1.4 192.168.3.3 80/tcp WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
3 Attack Department D Cluster 192.168.3.3 192.168.4.100 23/tcp TELNET bsd telnet exploit response
4 Ping Dep A Cluster 192.168.3.3 192.168.11.103 456/icmp ICMP PING Microsoft Windows
5 Scan Dep A Cluster 192.168.3.3 192.168.11.103 22/tcp SCAN SSH Version map attempt
6 Attack Dep A Cluster 192.168.3.3 192.168.11.103 22/tcp EXPLOIT ssh CRC32 overflow
Table 5.1: Scenario 1’s attack steps
5.1.1 Host Impact
Figure 5.2 displays the impact scores for each host per attack step. According to Chapter 3,
a host’s score should update when an exposure on one of its services is asserted. The graph
in Figure 5.2 shows that the impact scores for attacked hosts changing on the correct step.
Notice that on step 1, the FTP server’s IH changes, on step 2, the internal web server’s score
changes, on step 3, Department D’s cluster IH changes, and finally on step 6, Department
A’s cluster IH changes. The alerts in steps 4 and 5 are considered reconnaissance, and have
damage scores of 0, thus not affecting the host’s IH .
53
Figure 5.2: Host impact scores for scenario 1
5.1.2 Service Impact
In Figure 5.3, the impact scores for each service are shown changing for each step in the
attack. A service’s impact score is expected to change under the similar conditions as
the host impact score. Again, referencing the algorithms from Chapter 3, the IS should
change when an exposure on one of the service’s instantiations within the network has
been asserted, and if it has a larger damage score than any other asserted node in that
particular instantiation. The graph shows the correct services changing with respect to the
attack. The FTP service is first asserted in step 1, followed by the HTTP service in step 2,
the Telnet service in step 3, and the SSH service in step 6. Once again, the alerts in steps 4
and 5 do not affect the IS results.
5.1.3 User Impact
The impact scores for each user per attack step are presented in Figure 5.4. Algorithms
from Chapter 3 show that a user’s impact score should change whenever an exposure has
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Figure 5.3: Service impact scores for scenario 1
been asserted causing a change in any of the host impact scores that the user has an account
on. The first observation made is that there is a lot more movement in this graph than
in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. This is primarily due to the fact that a single machine typically
supports multiple users, therefore all of them will be affected when attacked. This can be
easily pointed out in Figure 5.4 on step 6 when the Department A Cluster is attacked. All
of the users who have accounts on that cluster, Administrator, Admin-A, Alice, and Jon
all have their impact scores changed. Each of them change differently depending on how
many accounts they have and how important the account with Department-A Cluster is to
them.
5.1.4 Network Impact
Figure 5.5 displays the results for the impact score of the network (IN ). According to our
definition, the IN score is expected to change whenever a IH score changes in the network.
The graph follows the correct pattern, as it changes at steps 1,2,3 and 6, but not 4 or 5 as
these are steps where no host impact scores changed (Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.4: User impact scores for scenario 1
Figure 5.5: Network impact scores for scenario 1
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5.1.5 Reference Scores
The two reference impact scores discussed in Chapter 3, IX-MEH and IX-MES can also
provide valuable insight for an analyst, especially when compared to the regular impact
scores. However, displaying all three of the impact scores for each component on the same
plot would make them very cluttered and difficult to read. Ideally, a single plot would be
able to display all three impact scores simultaneously so that the analyst could easily study
the situation.
Figure 5.6: Impact scores for the network for scenario 1
For the network, these scores can easily be displayed as shown in Figure 5.6. Notice that
there are three separate areas showing on the plot. The IN area displays a score representing
how much of the network has potentially been impacted by attack. The difference between
the IN and IN -MES line is the IN -MES envelope area. This area shows what the impact
could be if the already asserted services were fully exploited, which could be very useful
to indicate the impact of the security flaw of the corresponding services. The remaining
IN -MEH area represents the maximum impact score that can be reached for the network.
Using the graph to visually compare this versus the IN and IN -MES allows the analyst to
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easily assess the current and potential impact on the network.
Unless a particularly interesting situation arises, the scenarios that will be presented
in the following sections will only display the standard IX impact scores. Note that the
IX-MEH scores are constant for a given configuration. Tables 5.2-5.5 summarizes the
IX-MEH scores for the entities in the test network.
Hostname IH -MEH
Dep A Cluster 0.7
Dep A FileServer 0.85
Dep B Cluster 0.7
Dep B FileServer 0.85
Dep C Cluster 0.7
Dep C DomainController 0.7
Dep C FileServer 0.85








Table 5.2: IH-MEH scores for the test network

















Table 5.3: IS-MEH scores for the test network
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Table 5.4: IU -MEH scores for the test network
Network IN -MEH
Test Network 0.7954762
Table 5.5: IN -MEH scores for the test network
5.2 Scenario Analysis
The following sections discuss a variety of scenarios, each of which may add to the overall
impact assessment analysis.
5.2.1 Scenario 2
Scenario 2, displayed in Figure 5.7 is a relatively simple attack that starts by compromising
the external web server. Next, it attacks the FTP server and then steps to the internal
servers by attacking the internal web server. From there the attacker applies a back door
to the Department D cluster and also compromises the main DC. Finally, the attack targets
Department B’s file server followed by Department A’s cluster and file server. Detailed
attack steps can be found in Table 5.6.
Looking at the IH results in Figure 5.8, a network analyst can tell that through step
4, only machines in the external server domain may have been attacked. The IN results in
Figure 5.11 show that only attacking these machines has little affect on the overall network.
Besides Administrator, no other users are affected until the FTP server is attacked. When
the FTP server is attacked, users with accounts on occur an impact, however none of them
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Figure 5.7: Topological view of scenario 2’s attack steps
appear to be affected much (Figure 5.10). At this point, an analyst could use this infor-
mation to help limit the potential damage. Since the FTP server really does not affect the
overall network or users much, there should not be many problems that result from taking it
off the network. The analyst could inform the users of the FTP server that any data on there
may have been compromised and that it will be shutting for the time being. If necessary,
they should use other means to transfer files.
As the rest of the attack progresses, impact scores increase relative to what has been at-
tacked. The IS shown in Figure 5.9 give the administrators a good idea of what services the
attacker is compromising. This, combined with the IH can be used to pinpoint the weak-
nesses in the network. Services whose score jumps multiple times on different machines
are services that may be capable of bringing a network to its knees. Notice that the HTTP
and NetBIOS service impact scores change a few times because two Web and File Servers
are targeted on this specific attack. If this becomes a trend, it will become increasingly nec-
essary to patch these services. A potential warning sign for future attacks on a particular
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Step Description Source IP Dest IP Port/Prot Alert Signature
1 Scan External Web Server 140.203.195.48 192.168.1.2 80/tcp WEB-MISC http directory traversal
2 Attack Ext. Web Server 140.203.195.48 192.168.1.2 80/tcp WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
3 Scan FTP Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.4 21/tcp FTP adm scan
4 Attack FTP Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.4 21/tcp FTP ADMw0rm ftp login attempt
5 Compromise Int. Web Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.3 80/tcp WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
6 Ping Dep-D 192.168.3.3 192.168.4.100 456/icmp ICMP PING Microsoft Windows
7 Get info about Main DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 / DNS named version attempt
8 Attack Main DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 / DNS EXPLOIT named overflow attempt
9 Attack Main DC Again 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 / RPC status GHBN format string attack
10 Apply Backdoor to Dep-D 192.168.3.3 192.168.4.100 107/tcp BACKDOOR subseven DEFCON8 2.1 access
11 Scan Dep-B File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.20.2 / NETBIOS SMB Startup Folder access attempt
12 Gain access to Dep-B File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.20.2 / NETBIOS SMB C$ access
13 Attack Dep-B File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.20.2 / NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
14 Scan for SSH on Dep-A Cluster 192.168.20.2 192.168.11.100 / SCAN SSH Version map attempt
15 Attack Dep-A Cluster SSH 192.168.20.2 192.168.11.100 / EXPLOIT ssh CRC32 overflow
16 Attack Dep-A File Server 192.168.11.100 192.168.10.2 / NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
Table 5.6: Scenario 2’s attack steps
service running on other machines may be if an attack on a service causes an IH to rapidly
increase, however the IS is not particularly high (meaning that the service may be running
on other machines as well).
Figure 5.8: Host impact scores for scenario 2
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Figure 5.9: Service impact scores for scenario 2
Figure 5.10: User impact scores for scenario 2
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Figure 5.11: Network impact scores for scenario 2
5.2.2 Scenario 3
Figure 5.12 shows Scenario 3’s attack progression. It is another fairly small attack, similar
to Scenario 2, however it targets different machines. It starts by attacking the mail and
web external servers, followed by the web, file, and SQL internal servers. From there, it
attempts to attack Department C’s cluster with a DoS attack. Refer to Table 5.7 for detailed
attack steps.
Step Description Source IP Dest IP Port/Prot Alert Signature
1 Scan External Web Server 30.54.126.213 192.168.1.2 80/tcp WEB-MISC http directory traversal
2 Attack Ext. Web Server 30.54.126.213 192.168.1.2 80/tcp WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
3 Attack Mail Server (POP3) 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 110/tcp POP3 USER overflow attempt
4 Attack Mail Server (SMTP) 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 25/tcp SMTP RCPT TO overflow
5 Attack Mail Server (SMTP) 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 25/tcp SMTP exchange mime DOS
6 Compromise Internal Web Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.3 80/tcp WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
7 Ping SQL from Int. Web Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.5 1433/tcp MS-SQL ping attempt
8 Attack SQL from Int. Web Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.5 1433/tcp WEB-MISC PCCS mysql database admin tool access
9 Attack Main File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.4 445/tcp NETBIOS nimda RICHED20.DLL
10 Attack Main File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.4 445/tcp NETBIOS SMB trans2open buffer overflow attempt
11 Attack Main File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.4 445/tcp NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
12 Scan Dep-C 192.168.3.3 192.168.31.100 456/icmp ICMP PING Microsoft Windows
13 Attack Real Audio on Dep-C 30.54.126.213 192.168.31.100 276/tcp DOS Real Audio Server
Table 5.7: Scenario 3’s attack steps
Overall, it would make sense that a network administrator’s IU increase on almost all
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Figure 5.12: Topological view of scenario 3’s attack steps
attack steps, because they oversee the entire network. However, there are two trends from
scenario 3 that welcome discussion. In Figure 5.15, notice that Administrator is initially
affected before any other user (this was also the case in scenario 2), and that their IU is
significantly higher than the other users’. The obvious answer to why the Administrator’s
IU initially jumps before the other users’ is because the other users do not have accounts on
the machines that were attacked. This may be true, however another reason could be that
the affected accounts may not be very important to the other users. The first few machines
attacked are servers on the main external and internal subnets. When an outside attacker
attacks the external servers and even the internal servers, it would appear that the global
Administrator’s IU jumps fairly quickly. Therefore, the Administrator’s IU may be used as
an early indication someone is attacking the external and internal server domains.
Using Figure 5.16, this scenario can be used to show the value of IN -MES . The IN -
MES can be used to summarize how damaged the network potentially could be if the
attacker fully exploited the services that they have already attacked. The interesting notion
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about IN -MES is that it almost acts as a predictor for attacks on single machines. For
example, let us analyze the IN -MES for the attack on the main file server, specifically
attack steps 9-11. According to the main file server’s IH in Figure 5.13, it appears as
though step 9 of the attack moderately harmless, causing only a small change in the IH .
This is also verified from the small increase in IN shown in Figure 5.16. However, the
steep rise of the IN -MES compared to the shallow one of the IN shows that potentially,
there can be much more damage done to the network. Steps 10 and 11 continue to attack
the NetBIOS service on the main file server, and the IN catches up to the IN -MES . This
is the case for many of smaller series of attacks. Notice that the IN does not always fully
catch up to the IN -MES . This remaining area is damage that can still technically be done
on the network. For a longer attack, this gap has the capability of becoming quite large if
all services are not fully exploited.
Figure 5.13: Host impact scores for scenario 3
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Figure 5.14: Service impact scores for scenario 3
5
Figure 5.15: User impact scores for scenario 3
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Figure 5.16: IN and IN -MES for scenario 3
5.2.3 Interweaving Attacks 2 & 3
This scenario involves analyzing what would happen if scenarios 2 and 3 were executed
simultaneously, interweaving their attack steps (see Table 5.8). Since the two scenarios
mostly target different machines, performing them together should results in higher impact
scores for a larger variety of users. Figures 5.17-5.20 show the impact scores per attack
step. These plots show similar trends as those from scenarios 2 and 3, and may be analyzed
in the same way. Notice that there are a lot more components that are affected because of
the combined attacks.
Figures 5.21-5.24 display the final impact scores for each scenario and the combined
scenario for each of the components. The IH results in Figure 5.21 show that by combining
the attacks, the combined IH appears to be the maximum of the IH from scenarios 2 and
3. However, the max function is not quite valid. The problem is not in the scoring, the
scenarios need to be analyzed a bit further. The combination rule appears to be the max
function because there are no cases where multiple services are attacked on the same host
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Attack Step Description Source IP Dest IP Alert Signature
2 1 Scan External Web Server 140.203.195.48 192.168.1.2 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
2 2 Attack Ext. Web Server 140.203.195.48 192.168.1.2 WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
2 3 Scan FTP Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.4 FTP adm scan
2 4 Attack FTP Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.4 FTP ADMw0rm ftp login attempt
3 1 Scan External Web Server 30.54.126.213 192.168.1.2 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
3 2 Attack Ext. Web Server 30.54.126.213 192.168.1.2 WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
2 5 Compromise Internal Web Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.3 WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
3 3 Attack Mail Server (POP3) 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 POP3 USER overflow attempt
3 4 Attack Mail Server (SMTP) 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 SMTP RCPT TO overflow
3 5 Attack Mail Server (SMTP) 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 SMTP exchange mime DOS
2 6 Ping Dep-D 192.168.3.3 192.168.4.100 ICMP PING Microsoft Windows
2 7 Get info about Main DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 DNS named version attempt
2 8 Attack Main DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 DNS EXPLOIT named overflow attempt
2 9 Attack Main DC Again 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 RPC status GHBN format string attack
2 10 Apply Backdoor to DepD 192.168.3.3 192.168.4.100 BACKDOOR subseven DEFCON8 2.1 access
3 6 Compromise Internal Web Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.3 WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
2 11 Scan DepB File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.20.2 NETBIOS SMB Startup Folder access attempt
2 12 Gain access to DepB File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.20.2 NETBIOS SMB C$ access
3 7 Ping SQL 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.5 MS-SQL ping attempt
3 8 Attack SQL 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.5 WEB-MISC PCCS mysql database admin tool access
2 13 Attack DepB File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.20.2 NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
3 9 Attack Main File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.4 NETBIOS nimda RICHED20.DLL
3 10 Attack Main File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.4 NETBIOS SMB trans2open buffer overflow attempt
2 14 Scan for SSH on DepA Cluster 192.168.20.2 192.168.11.100 SCAN SSH Version map attempt
3 11 Attack Main File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.4 NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
2 15 Attack Dep-A Cluster SSH 192.168.20.2 192.168.11.100 EXPLOIT ssh CRC32 overflow
3 12 Scan Dep-D 192.168.3.3 192.168.31.100 ICMP PING Microsoft Windows
2 16 Attack DepA File Server 192.168.11.100 192.168.10.2 NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
3 13 Attack Real Audio on Dep-D 30.54.126.213 192.168.31.100 DOS Real Audio Server
Table 5.8: Interweaving attack steps of scenarios 2 and 3
by a separate attack, thus one of the scenario’s impact scores is 0. Therefore, referring back
to Figure 3.2, the IH score will not change if other services are not asserted. The lack of
services is due to the limited test network being used.
Similar to the combined IH results, most of the combined IS results in Figure 5.22
appear to be the result of a max function. However, the same idea applies here for the
services as it did for the hosts. The NetBIOS service is attacked by scenario 2 on steps 11,
12, 13, and 16 and by scenario 3 on steps 9, 10, and 11, therefore each scenario produces
some kind of impact on the NetBIOS service. The combination rules for the IS Algorithm
(Figure 3.3) are used to determine the combined result.
The combined IU results best contribute to how components impact scores may be
largely affected if multiple attacks compromise different parts of the network. Figure 5.23
shows most of the combined scores being greater in value than each of the individual at-
tacks. However, these combined scores depend on a variety of things such as: if same
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exploits were made on the same machines and how important the accounts are to a user
whose hosts attacked. Kate for example, has an IU of 0.1716 after scenario 2 and 0.1890
from scenario 3. Combined, Kate has an IU of 0.3606, which is basically the sum of the
two individual scores. However Administrator has a IU of 0.4604 from scenario 2, 0.3920
from scenario 3, and a combined score of 0.6713. The combined score is obviously not the
sum the two individual scores.
Finally, Figure 5.24 shows the comparison of overall network scores. All of these
results and plots can be used to show what the damage could be if multiple attacks are exe-
cuted. They also may provide some insight on which attack affected a specific component
the most.
This type of analysis may also be helpful for detecting coordinated attacks. For ex-
ample, if one attack has illogical steps involved in it, then by combining other attacks in
the attack analysis, more components are most likely going to be asserted. In a real-time
system with automatic updates of network configurations, including ports opened by back
door attacks, or changed firewall rules, these added asserted components may cause illogi-
cal attacks to disappear, implying a coordinated attack.
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Figure 5.17: Host impact scores for interweaving scenarios 2 and 3
Figure 5.18: Service impact scores for interweaving scenarios 2 and 3
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Figure 5.19: User impact scores for interweaving scenarios 2 and 3
Figure 5.20: Network impact scores for interweaving scenarios 2 and 3
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Figure 5.21: Final host impact scores for comparing scenarios 2, 3, and 2 & 3 together
Figure 5.22: Final service impact scores for comparing scenarios 2, 3, and 2 & 3 together
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Figure 5.23: Final user impact scores for comparing scenarios 2, 3, and 2 & 3 together
Figure 5.24: Final network impact scores for comparing scenarios 2, 3, and 2 & 3 together
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5.2.4 Scenario 4 - Insider Attack
So far, only attack scenarios from outside threats have been analyzed. In today’s world,
insider threats are also common. These attacks may come from disgruntled employees,
employees coerced into helping a hacker, a hacker physically gaining access to an inside
machine, or possibly from an employee snooping around or showing off their hacking
capabilities. Figure 5.25 show’s an attack progression of an insider attack, initiated from
the Department C cluster.
Consider the results shown in Figures 5.26-5.29 from the perspective of a network
analyst. Noticing any major differences between an outsider attack and this one may lead
to tell-tale signs that an insider attack has occurred. A few observations include:
• The first few affected hosts are not from the internal or external server domains.
• The services initially attacked to not match with any of the services on the external
server domain.
• The global Administrator’s IU does not spike like it did in the previous scenarios.
• IU for users with accounts in Department-C initially spike, particularly Admin-C’s.
Another item that may flag concern is the fact that Department C is supposedly very secure.
The network is configured such that anyone outside that department is not supposed to have
access, especially to the servers.
Detecting insider attacks can be a difficult task and cause maximum damage to a net-
work if combined with a second attack. For example, Kate has access to both Department
B and C, giving her accounts on Department C’s file server, DC, and cluster, along with
Department B’s file server, cluster, and the main file server and DC. Kate could potentially
compromise all of those servers from an “already has access” point of view. Once she
gathers the secure information such as user names and passwords of other people, she can
either use the information herself or relay it to an outsider which would ease their attack.
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Figure 5.25: Topological view of scenario 4’s attack steps
Step Description Source IP Dest IP Port/Prot Alert Signature
1 Attack Dep-C DC 192.168.31.104 192.168.30.2 53/tcp DNS named version attempt
2 Attack Dep-C DC 192.168.31.104 192.168.30.2 53/tcp DNS EXPLOIT named overflow attempt
3 Attack Dep-C File Server 192.168.31.104 192.168.30.3 139/tcp NETBIOS SMB C$ access
4 Attack Dep-C File Server 192.168.31.104 192.168.30.3 139/tcp NETBIOS SMB ADMIN$access
5 Attack Dep-B Cluster 192.168.31.104 192.168.20.102 22/tcp SCAN SSH Version map attempt
6 Attack Dep-B Cluster 192.168.31.104 192.168.20.102 22/tcp ATTACK-RESPONSE success gobbles ssh explt (GOBBLE)
7 Attack Main DC 192.168.20.102 192.168.3.2 135/tcp RPC mountd TCP exportall request
8 Attack Main DC 192.168.20.102 192.168.3.2 53/tcp DNS EXPLOIT named 8.2-to-8.21
Table 5.9: Scenario 4’s attack steps
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Figure 5.26: Host impact scores for scenario 4
Figure 5.27: Service impact scores for scenario 4
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Figure 5.28: User impact scores for scenario 4
Figure 5.29: Network impact scores for scenario 4
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5.2.5 Scenario 5 - Logical vs. Illogical Attack Steps
Scenario 5 was created to experiment with illogical attacks steps. This scenario was run
twice, first not allowing illogical attacks to be processed, and then a second time allowing
them to be. The scenario shown in Figure 5.30 has four illogical attack steps, steps 9-12
(see Table 5.10). Once the hacker gains access to the internal server domain, they attempt
Figure 5.30: Topological view of scenario 5’s attack steps 1
to attack Department C’s servers. The configuration of the network does not allow these
servers to be accessed from outside of the department, thus they are labeled illogical. After
this, the Department C servers become an illegal stepping stone to propagate further into
the network, and attacks are executed from there. From these servers, there is a sequence
of six steps that are considered valid, however the source of the attack is from a machine
that was compromised using illogical attacks. Following these attacks, the attacker returns
1The dashed attack lines are illogical attacks. The dotted-dashed attack lines are logical attacks from a
machine that was compromised using illogical attacks.
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to the internal web server and continues to exploit other areas of the network. For easy
comparison, each of the IX results for both the logical and illogical processed attacks are
displayed on the same page. Refer to Figures 5.31-5.37 for the results.
Step Description Source IP Dest IP Port/Prot Alert Signature
1 Scan External Web Server 140.203.195.48 192.168.1.2 80/tcp WEB-MISC http directory traversal
2 Attack Ext. Web Server 140.203.195.48 192.168.1.2 80/tcp WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
3 Scan FTP Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.4 21/tcp FTP adm scan
4 Attack FTP Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.4 21/tcp FTP ADMw0rm ftp login attempt
5 Compromise Internal Web Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.3 80/tcp WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
6 Get info about Main DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 / DNS named version attempt
7 Attack Main DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 / DNS EXPLOIT named overflow attempt
8 Attack Main DC Again 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 / RPC status GHBN format string attack
9* Recon on Dep-C DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.30.2 / DNS zone transfer TCP
10* Attack Dep-C DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.30.2 / DNS EXPLOIT named 8.2-to-8.21
11* Access Dep-C File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.30.3 / NETBIOS SMB ADMIN$access
12* Attack Dep-C File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.30.3 / NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
13 Attack Dep-C Cluster 192.168.30.3 192.168.31.100 / DOS Real Audio Server
14 Attack Dep-B Cluster SSH 192.168.30.2 192.168.20.100 / SCAN SSH Version map attempt
15 Attack Dep-B Cluster SSH 192.168.30.2 192.168.20.100 / EXPLOIT ssh CRC32 overflow
16 Scan Dep-B File Server 192.168.20.100 192.168.20.2 / NETBIOS SMB Startup Folder access attempt
17 Gain access to Dep-B File Server 192.168.20.100 192.168.20.2 / NETBIOS SMB C$ access
18 Attack Dep-B File Server 192.168.20.100 192.168.20.2 / NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
19 Attack Dep-B File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.20.2 / NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
20 Scan for SSH on Dep-A Cluster 192.168.20.2 192.168.11.100 / SCAN SSH Version map attempt
21 Attack Dep-A Cluster SSH 192.168.20.2 192.168.11.100 / EXPLOIT ssh CRC32 overflow
22 Attack Dep-A File Server 192.168.11.100 192.168.10.2 / NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
Table 5.10: Scenario 5’s attack steps. 2
Notice in Figure 5.31 that there are no changes for the IH of Department C’s domain
controller and file server. This verifies that the illogical attacks were not processed by the
impact assessment engine. All of the plots showing the results from processing illogical
attacks have no changes in the IX for steps 9-12.
Processing illogical steps could increase the overall network impact (Figure 5.37) and
the impact scores of individual host, service, or user components. If scores do increase,
and then logical steps follow that affect the same components, these impact scores could
become misleading. For example, notice in Figures 5.33 and 5.34 that the IS for the DNS
and NetBIOS services end up approximately 0.35 and 0.25 higher when illogical attacks are
processed, when according to the terrain model these attacks can not happen. Users from
Department C also incur inflated impact scores. Impact scores from processing illogical
attacks may be another score that analysts can compare against. It provides the potential
2Step numbers with an * next to them are Illogical attacks.
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impact if the attack was actually successful, even though the model says it can’t be.
With regard to attacks whose source is a machine compromised from an illogical attack,
having the illogical attack flag available may be useful to the analyst. When such scenarios
occur, either the terrain is configured incorrectly, a valid IDS alert was mistakingly filtered
out, or that a hacker may have created a back door or reconfigured firewall rules.
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Figure 5.31: Host impact scores for scenario 5, logical attack processing
Figure 5.32: Host impact scores for scenario 5, illogical attack processing
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Figure 5.33: Service impact scores for scenario 5, logical attack processing
Figure 5.34: Service impact scores for scenario 5, illogical attack processing
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Figure 5.35: User impact scores for scenario 5, logical attack processing
Figure 5.36: User impact scores for scenario 5, illogical attack processing
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Figure 5.37: Network impact scores for scenario 5, combined view
5.2.6 Scenario 7 - Department Attacks
This scenario was specifically created to show how different configurations can affect im-
pact scores. The same attack scenario (Figure 5.38) is run four times, each on a different
department. Each of the four departments’ cluster are setup with the same exact telnet ser-
vice that will be exploited. IN scores are collected for each scenario. In order for the IN to
be related to the department, the machine criticalities are set with respect to the department,
not to the overall network. The four new schema configurations can be found on the thesis
CD for more details.
Table 5.11 shows the attack steps with respect to Department A. Steps 1-14 are identical
for all four department attack. Steps 15-17 change depending on what department is being
attacked.
The department impact scores are shown in Figure 5.39. Departments A, B, and D all
have very similar values and patterns, yet they are slightly different due to their different
configurations. For example, Department A cannot access the main file server, however,
Departments B and D can. When the main file server is attacked (steps 12-14), Department
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Figure 5.38: Topological view of scenario 7’s attack steps
B and D’s impact scores change, but Department A’s does not. Department C appears to be
least affected by the attack. This is because it uses its own authentication and file servers
and does not have access to the FTP server. Therefore attacks on the FTP server, main file
server, and main DC do not impact Department C. Also, although Department C has the
telnet service on its cluster, the attack is illogical, because the router does not permit telnet
traffic to pass through from the internal servers domain.
Table 5.12 shows the IN -MEH for each department. Although they each have various
configurations, it appears that their highest potential impact scores are all about the same.
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Step Description Source IP Dest IP Port/Prot Alert Signature
1 Scan External Web Server 140.203.195.48 192.168.1.2 80/tcp WEB-MISC http directory traversal
2 Attack Ext. Web Server 140.203.195.48 192.168.1.2 80/tcp WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
3 Attack Mail Server (POP3) 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 110/tcp POP3 USER overflow attempt
4 Attack Mail Server (SMTP) 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 25/tcp SMTP RCPT TO overflow
5 Attack Mail Server (SMTP) 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 25/tcp SMTP exchange mime DOS
6 Scan FTP Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.4 21/tcp FTP adm scan
7 Attack FTP Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.4 21/tcp FTP ADMw0rm ftp login attempt
8 Compromise Internal Web Server 192.168.1.2 192.168.3.3 80/tcp WEB-IIS .asa HTTP header buffer overflow attempt
9 Get info about Main DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 / DNS named version attempt
10 Attack Main DC 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 / DNS EXPLOIT named overflow attempt
11 Attack Main DC Again 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.2 / RPC status GHBN format string attack
12 Attack Main File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.4 445/tcp NETBIOS nimda RICHED20.DLL
13 Attack Main File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.4 445/tcp NETBIOS SMB trans2open buffer overflow attempt
14 Attack Main File Server 192.168.3.3 192.168.3.4 445/tcp NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
15 Attack Dep-A Cluster 192.168.3.3 192.168.11.102 23/tcp WEB-MISC telnet attempt
16 Attack Dep-A Cluster 192.168.3.3 192.168.11.102 23/tcp TELNET EZsetup account attempt
17 Attack Dep-A Cluster 192.168.3.3 192.168.11.102 23/tcp TELNET bsd telnet exploit response






Table 5.12: IN -MEH for each department configuration
Figure 5.39: Individual department impact scores for scenario 7
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5.2.7 Scenario 8 - Randomly Generated Attack Data
The previous scenarios were all manually created to help demonstrate different elements of
the impact scores and how the overall system could potentially be used. Having attack data
that is randomly generated can be used to solidify the capability of the system.
The steps in Tables 5.14-5.18 were randomly generated by an attack simulator devel-
oped by students in the RIT Industrial Engineering Department. Given a network that has
machines defined with services and exposures, along with connectors (routers), the sim-
ulator has the capability to generate random attacks. The attacks are based on a variety
of metrics including efficiency, stealth, skill, target, goal, step time, and start time. These
metrics are primarily used to define how direct an attack path is, the tendency to raise alerts
by achieving more goals, and to determine the success probability for each step. The sim-
ulator team created scenario with five separate attack tracks, one shown in each table. The
metrics for the scenario are shown in Table 5.13.
Attack Efficiency Stealth Skill Target Goal Step Time Start Time
First 0.3 1.0 0.999 192.168.3.4 Dos 5 0
Second 0.3 0.9 0.999 192.168.4.102 Backdoor 5 10
Third 0.4 0.95 0.999 192.168.20.101 Backdoor 4 14
Fourth 0.2 0.99 0.999 192.168.30.3 Dos 3 21
Fifth 0.5 1.0 0.999 192.168.31.103 Dos 5 26
Table 5.13: Attack parameters for simulator to generate Scenario 8
Currently, the simulator does not take into account router firewall rules, so it does not
distinguish logical versus illogical attacks. These results assume that all of the generated
attacks are logical.
The five individual attack tracks could be analyzed in two ways: together, showing the
maximum damage occurred if the five attacks were coordinated, or separate. The first type
of results and analysis are similar to that of scenarios 2, 3, and 2 & 3 combined. We have not
yet analyzed a scenario with separate attack tracks. Figure 5.40 shows an example of this
type of analysis. The plot shows Dave’s user impact scores from each of the five separate
attack tracks. For analysis purposes and because time information was not produced with
the attack steps, it is assumed that the attacks steps occur simultaneously. Figure 5.40
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demonstrates the changing impact scores and what an analyst might see as attack tracks
progress. Initially, the analyst my be concerned about attack track 4. However, as time
goes on it becomes clear that attack track 2 has the largest impact on Dave. This attack
track analysis could be done for every component that has an impact score, giving the
analyst insight on what attacks may be most harmful.
Step Description Source IP Dest IP Alert Signature
1 Recon Enumeration 84.31.173.66 192.168.1.2 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
2 Intrusion Root 112.124.121.1 192.168.1.3 SMTP sendmail 5.5.5 exploit
3 Escalation Service 143.9.55.104 192.168.1.3 SMTP RCPT TO overflow
4 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.3.5 MS-SQL/SMB sp adduser database user creation
5 Escalation Service 192.168.1.3 192.168.3.4 NETBIOS SMB trans2open buffer overflow attempt
6 Recon Enumeration 192.168.3.4 192.168.3.3 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
7 Goal Dos 192.168.3.4 192.168.3.4 NETBIOS DOS RFPoison
Table 5.14: Scenario 8’s randomly generated Attack Track 1
Step Description Source IP Dest IP Alert Signature
1 Intrusion Root 145.115.200.103 192.168.1.3 SMTP sendmail 5.5.5 exploit
2 Escalation Service 226.129.132.52 192.168.1.3 POP3 USER overflow attempt
3 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 IMAP authenticate overflow attempt
4 Escalation Service 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 SMTP RCPT TO overflow
5 Escalation Service 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 SMTP RCPT TO overflow
6 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 IMAP authenticate overflow attempt
7 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 IMAP authenticate overflow attempt
8 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 IMAP authenticate overflow attempt
9 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.4.102 TELNET bsd telnet exploit response
10 Escalation Service 192.168.4.102 192.168.3.4 NETBIOS SMB trans2open buffer overflow attempt
11 Intrusion Root 192.168.3.4 192.168.3.5 MS-SQL/SMB sp adduser database user creation
12 Goal Backdoor 192.168.3.5 192.168.4.102 BACKDOOR subseven DEFCON8 2.1 access
Table 5.15: Scenario 8’s randomly generated Attack Track 2
Step Description Source IP Dest IP Alert Signature
1 Recon Enumeration 125.235.227.212 192.168.1.2 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
2 Recon Enumeration 19.144.127.233 192.168.1.2 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
3 Escalation Service 93.91.218.181 192.168.1.3 POP3 USER overflow attempt
4 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 SMTP sendmail 5.5.5 exploit
5 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 IMAP authenticate overflow attempt
6 Recon Enumeration 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.2 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
7 Escalation Service 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 SMTP RCPT TO overflow
8 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.4.101 TELNET bsd telnet exploit response
9 Escalation Service 192.168.4.101 192.168.3.4 NETBIOS SMB trans2open buffer overflow attempt
10 Misc VirusTrojan 192.168.3.4 192.168.3.4 NETBIOS nimda RICHED20.DLL
11 Intrusion User 192.168.3.4 192.168.20.102 MISC AIM AddExternalApp attempt
12 Goal Backdoor 192.168.20.102 192.168.20.101 BACKDOOR HackAttack 1.20 Connect
Table 5.16: Scenario 8’s randomly generated Attack Track 3
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Step Description Source IP Dest IP Alert Signature
1 Intrusion Root 10.102.204.253 192.168.1.3 SMTP sendmail 5.5.5 exploit
2 Escalation Service 207.16.55.88 192.168.1.3 SMTP RCPT TO overflow
3 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 SMTP sendmail 5.5.5 exploit
4 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 SMTP sendmail 5.5.5 exploit
5 Recon Enumeration 192.168.1.3 192.168.4.105 WEB-MISC telnet attempt
6 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.4.105 TELNET bsd telnet exploit response
7 Escalation Service 192.168.4.105 192.168.3.4 NETBIOS SMB trans2open buffer overflow attempt
8 Intrusion User 192.168.3.4 192.168.3.2 DNS EXPLOIT named 8.2-to-8.21
9 Escalation Service 192.168.3.2 192.168.3.5 MS-SQL xp proxiedmetadata possible buffer overflow
10 Intrusion Root 192.168.3.5 192.168.4.104 WEB-MISC telnet attempt
11 Intrusion User 192.168.4.104 192.168.3.5 MS-SQL xp showcolv possible buffer overflow
12 Intrusion Root 192.168.3.5 192.168.3.5 MS-SQL/SMB sp adduser database user creation
13 Escalation Service 192.168.3.5 192.168.3.5 MS-SQL xp proxiedmetadata possible buffer overflow
14 Intrusion Root 192.168.3.5 192.168.30.3 RPC tooltalk UDP overflow attempt
15 Intrusion User 192.168.3.5 192.168.31.102 MISC AIM AddExternalApp attempt
16 Intrusion User 192.168.31.102 192.168.31.102 MISC AIM AddGame attempt
17 Escalation Service 192.168.31.102 192.168.30.2 DNS EXPLOIT named overflow attempt
18 Intrusion User 192.168.30.2 192.168.31.103 MISC AIM AddExternalApp attempt
19 Intrusion User 192.168.31.103 192.168.31.105 MISC AIM AddGame attempt
20 Goal Dos 192.168.31.105 192.168.30.3 NETBIOS SMB DCERPC ISystemActivator bind attempt
Table 5.17: Scenario 8’s randomly generated Attack Track 4
Step Description Source IP Dest IP Alert Signature
1 Recon Enumeration 62.73.133.23 192.168.1.2 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
2 Intrusion Root 151.219.32.6 192.168.1.3 IMAP authenticate overflow attempt
3 Intrusion Root 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.3 IMAP authenticate overflow attempt
4 Intrusion User 192.168.1.3 192.168.4.100 TELNET EZsetup account attempt
5 Recon Enumeration 192.168.4.100 192.168.3.3 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
6 Intrusion Root 192.168.4.100 192.168.4.104 WEB-MISC telnet attempt
7 Recon Scanning 192.168.4.104 192.168.4.104 ICMP Traceroute
8 Recon Scanning 192.168.4.104 192.168.31.100 ICMP Traceroute
9 Goal Dos 192.168.4.104 192.168.31.103 DOS Real Audio Server
Table 5.18: Scenario 8’s randomly generated Attack Track 5
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Figure 5.40: User Dave’s impact score for each attack track in scenario 8
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5.3 Limitations and Summary of Results
During the development of VTAC, some assumptions were made to make implementation
more feasible:
1. Routers and switches are simply modeled as connectors. There is no information
regarding services running on them, or considering them as an attack target.
2. The impact algorithms assume processing Router Neighbor Permission List rules
with an Allowed attribute equal to true.
3. The impact algorithms assume processing Host Permission List rules with an Al-
lowed attribute equal to false.
4. The impact algorithms do not consider the Privilege attributes in users, services, or
exposures. The exposure damage score is used to embed the privilege information
(discussed in Section 4.2.2).
5. Due to lack of publicly available fully defined networks, and scanning tools incapable
of determining the overall mission of a network and its assets, arbitrary values used
for criticality and damage scores.
6. Hosts can only have multiple IP addresses. They are limited to one LAN card.
7. Attack path calculations assume a spanning tree topology.
8. Local services are not accounted for.
9. Services are considered completely independent of each other. Valeur, et al.[29],
propose a system where services may be dependent on one another.
10. There is no time limitation on how long an exposure may actually be affected. This
prevents impact scores from decreasing over time.
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Regardless of the limitations, the results presented in this chapter can provide an analyst
with a detailed impact assessment of the current state of their network. The assessment
heavily relies not only on a correct network configuration, but also numeric analysis. These
numeric impact scores combined with the analyst’s intuition and knowledge of the network,
provide them with better situational awareness. It is vital to remember that an incorrect
configuration or inaccurate criticalities can mislead the analyst’s perception.
In order to properly create an accurate terrain model, a variety of scanners and admin-
istrator input is needed. As discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.3, scanners with capabilities
similar to Nessus or NMap should be used to gather machine, service, vulnerability, and
connectivity data. Routers or switches need also be scanned to properly define permission
rules between different subnets or domains. A list of users, and what machines they have
accounts on is also required. A network administrator may have the inconvenience to de-
fine and update missing information such as criticality metrics for services, machines, and
accounts. Ideally, all of this information could be automatically provided.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
The VTAC system has two main contributions. The first contribution was the development
of a virtual cyber terrain used to model a network. The virtual terrain was designed to
include network characteristics that we deemed necessary to perform impact assessment of
cyber attacks. The terrain can be modeled as a directed graphs with attributed nodes and
edges. A test network was created with diverse configurations to demonstrate the capability
of the virtual terrain and the impact assessment algorithms. The second contribution was
the development of impact assessment algorithms used for host, service, user, and network
components. These algorithms make efficient use of the virtual terrain to gather informa-
tion and update impact scores. The scores resulting from these algorithms represent the
potential impact that an attack has had and can have on the component. A variety of sce-
narios were created and simulated to verify the virtual terrain configuration and the basic
trends of the impact scores.
The development of this impact analysis system allows analysts to better understand
and monitor the current state of their network. The scenario analysis provided insight on
how noticing certain score trends could be used to help protect the network.
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6.2 Future Work
Since the primary focus of this work was to introduce the concept of impact assessment
using a network model, rather than implementing a full-featured working prototype, there
are a number of possible extensions to this work. This section will discuss a few of these
extensions and the reasoning behind them.
6.2.1 Different Attack Scenarios and Network Configurations
Although the results proved to be insightful, they were the result of a manually created
test network and scenarios. Simulating the impact system over more realistic test networks
with a variety of configurations could be used to help validate results. Additional randomly
generated attack scenarios from the RIT simulator team, with the capability of producing
all logical attack steps, or true attack data from a real network may also prove helpful to
analyze the impact system.
6.2.2 Other Impact Algorithms
The designed impact algorithms were used to perform a rudimentary impact assessment
using the virtual terrain model. A deeper analysis of combination rules and other impact
scores is needed for future development. As mentioned in Section 5.3, privilege is not
taken into account when determining the impact scores. Adding in privilege as a factor in
the impact score may provide additional insight into the severeness of the attack.
6.2.3 Impact Projection
Section 3.2.6 discussed potential projection algorithms and how they can use of the vir-
tual terrain. Having impact projection capabilities may enhance the analyst’s situational
awareness and allow them to make more informed decisions.
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6.2.4 Real-Time Development
The current simulator presented in Section 4.1 does not factor in time of attack or exploit
expiration in any way. Development of a real-time simulator could include injecting attacks
at any time, rather than having a predefined list of steps executing at the push of a button.
Also, cyber attacks often expire after a certain period of time. Including this information
would make the impact system more realistic and indicative of critical attacks in real-time
by observing the fluctuation in impact scores.
6.2.5 Integration Into Larger Defense System
Impact assessment provides only one of many critical pieces necessary for defending a
network. Integration of VTAC into a larger defense system, where real attack tracks could
be input to VTAC and other analysis algorithms could use the output of VTAC, could
increase the overall situational awareness of the network and greatly aid a network analyst.
6.2.6 System Visualization
Visualization is an important aspect of complete systems. A system that has proper visual-
ization can often add to the user’s experience and the effectiveness of the software. VTAC’s
GUI was strictly developed for simulation purposes, not looks or effectiveness. There are
a number enhancements that could be made to VTAC’s appearance and capabilities. The
virtual terrain could be able to be displayed as a network picture, similar to the figures used
to display the attack scenarios. Clicking on an object could bring up all of the informa-
tion associated with it. Impact scores could be integrated into the picture of the network,
with scores above icons, or colors identifying impact severity. Real-time plots showing the
impact scores for each component could also be readily available.
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